In the aftermath of the Great Recession of [2007][2008][2009], the popular press has noted a rebound in casino revenues in some states, and some expect casino revenues to grow and increase again along with any economic recovery. However, before the recent recession, there were trends indicating stagnation or a peak of casino revenues in most states, and as the last recession has indicated, casino revenues were not "recession-proof" as most had thought previously. In fact, casino revenues in most states saw big declines. In this paper, we show that the casino revenues have stagnated or declined partially due to a saturation point being reached with regard to casino gaming in many areas of the United States. The growth rate of casino revenues as well as the tax receipts for the state governments from casinos follows an 'S' curve which is similar to a product life cycle curve. The introduction of more gambling venues as well as putting in slot machines at race tracks may give a temporary boost to state gambling tax receipts, but longer run trends indicate that the years of casinos showing large gains in revenues may be over unless casino operations continue to re-invent themselves.
Introduction:
Beginning in the late 1970s, more than twenty-four state governments in the US have enacted laws permitting legalized casino gambling, racinos (a combination of a casino and race track), state lotteries, electronic gaming devices at bars and entertainment centers, and tribal casinos. Some have written that the increased presence of gambling in different parts of the US comes as a result of more tolerant attitudes toward gambling, the need for states to raise more tax revenues, and local economic development goals and objectives (Madhusudhan 1996 , Eadington 1999 , Garrett 2003 , and Landers 2009 ). This expansion of gambling occurred in spite of fears about increased crime rates and personal bankruptcies (Friedman, Hakim, and Weinblatt 1989, Hsu 2000) and the cannibalization by casinos of other local hospitality and entertainment operators so that the net impact of a casino could be less than anticipated (Guell 2010 ).
The casino industry has experienced an explosive growth rate from the late 90's through mid-2000's. As a result, tax receipts from gambling became an important source of revenue for the state and local governments.
2 Guell (2010) wrote that casinos generate around $5 billion annually in tax receipts for state and local (S-L hereafter) jurisdictions on approximately $30 billion in casino revenues. Whether the casino industry can sustain this explosive growth and higher revenue in the long run is an issue that needs to be examined. The data on gambling revenue indicate that the trend in casino revenues over the last 20 years has followed an S-curve pattern, which is often observed when goods and services are offered in a market place. The trend or pattern is referred as a "product life cycle" with four stages such as -introductory, growth, maturity and declining stages. Therefore the focus of this paper is to determine whether 2 The gaming commission reports used in the analyses for this paper show that the bulk of the revenues go to the state governments. The local governments usually receive far less amounts. Also, Dadayan and Ward (2011) note that at most gambling tax revenues from lotteries, casinos, race tracks, etc. account for only 2% of tax revenue.
gambling revenues has been peaking, saturating (maturing) or declining on a per establishment basis, and, to explain the reasons for the stagnating revenues to the state government using long term data for eleven states 3 . We define casino saturation as too many casinos per state and metro region, which in turn results in declining per establishment and overall per state casino adjusted tax revenues and S-L government tax receipts.
Literature review:
As states have authorized or considered casinos, many authors have evaluated them from different perspectives ranging from social/economic impacts to revenue to S-L governments. Guell (2010) noted that casinos have only a slight impact on employment in communities with high unemployment prior to the casino opening, whereas Garrett (2003) found that casinos have their biggest employment impacts in rural areas. Some have written that casino costs outweigh benefits (Grinols and Mustard 2001) whereas others note inconclusive results in doing an evaluation (Eadington 1999) . Walker and Jackson (2007) wrote an article where it was shown that casinos have no real long term economic development impacts on states and localities. Wenz (2007 and 2008a) found that casinos raise nearby home values and have their greatest impacts in low population density areas and that economic activity was slightly greater in areas with Native American casinos than those with non-Native American casinos, although in general, casinos had very little impact on other quality of life variables. He also failed to find that a proliferation of casinos along the Mississippi River was due to states behaving strategically and trying an import substitution strategy (Wenz 2008b) . On the other hand, Navin and Sullivan 3 According to Dadayan and Ward (2011) In trying to explain how efficient casinos in five states were in generating gross revenues and S-L tax revenues given inputs such as gaming space, number of employees, etc., Lambert, Srinivasan, Dufrene, and Min (2010) found that those casinos which scored highest in a data envelopment analysis are those that were located in the urban core, central county of a MSA.
Whether a casino bordered another state (and thereby can "export" its gambling) was not shown to be a factor in casino efficiency scores, although racinos scored among the best.
After over a decade of casino operations in Indiana, Landers (2009) while Kentucky has continued to debate its merits (Gerth 2010 ).
There are a few studies in the literature that have explained the trend in the gambling revenues using a product life cycle approach. According to the product life cycle theory (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984) , products and services pass through distinct stages through a life cycle. In the introductory stage a product's "life" takes off gradually, and as markets start to accept the product, it shows increasing sales (sometimes at an increasing rate) one time period after another, which marks the growth stage. As time goes by, the rate of sales eventually peaks and slows down as more consumers adopt and use the product until most of the market is covered or saturated, which is referred to as a maturity state. Eventually, if a product is not rejuvenated or repackaged or introduced to a new market segment, and if new competing and alternative products are introduced, a product's sales can go into decline and could eventually become extinct (Kotler and Keller, 2012) . Stansfield (1978) studied the decline of tourism in Atlantic City and identified a four stage resort cycle similar to the product life cycle. The resorts had early success and exclusivity followed by a broad appeal to lower income groups, and then abandonment by early patrons, slow decline, and finally a decay in their popularity. Hofer (1975) suggested that major changes in business strategy are usually required during three stages of the life cycle: introduction, maturity, and decline. During late 1960's when the resorts decayed, Atlantic City sought to reinvent itself by legalizing gambling. Markusen (1985) and Blair (1995, page 118) write that regional economic success is, to one degree or another, based upon the profitability of the major industries/employers within a region, and this in turn depends upon at which stage these industries find their products in the product life cycle. A disproportionate number of industries/employers in an area which have products in the later stages of the product life cycle will find their profits peaking, which in turn means that regional economic performance may also be at a peak unless new and growing He projected that sales of lottery would level off in the future. Mikesell and Zorn (1987) validated earlier works of Vasche and DeBoer on lottery sales and reported that lottery sales begin to decline after approximately 11 years due to alternative wagering and competition (border effects) from surrounding states selling lotteries. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, the methods used to assess trends in casino gambling revenues per establishment are discussed followed by the results and a discussion of the findings. In the last section, we discuss any limitations of the research and policy recommendations with regard to S-L casino gambling for both states that currently have casinos as well as those considering the legalization of casino gambling.
Model:
The data are analyzed using a simple tabular/graphical analysis and regression analysis using an exponential growth forecasting model. For the tabular analysis (see Tables 1 and 2) (Insert Tables 1 and 2 around here)
Data:
5 Because of the possible endogeneity between tax revenues and tax rates, 2SLS regression was performed using winnings to patrons (WTP) or winning per admissions as an instrumental variable. WTP was chosen as an instrumental variable since greater payments to patrons result in less tax revenues and adjusted gross revenues to casinos since greater winnings paid out leave less money for taxes and casino earnings. (Navin and Sullivan 2007) .
The annual data for the 11 states for the last 20 years (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) were collected from annual reports for the gaming industry from various states. In 1991, 7 states in the US had granted licenses for commercial casino operations and subsequently Missouri started granting licenses in 1994, Indiana in 1996, and Michigan in 1997 (see Table 1 for number of casinos).
The data collected at the state level includes tax revenue for the S-L government (tax receipts) Data for eleven states (see Table 2 for a list) which have had casinos (whether riverboat or regular casinos) as well as racinos for the period of 1991 to 2010 are examined as a cohort to see whether casino gross revenues and casino revenue shares paid to the states and local governments, which grew rapidly during the 1990s, had peaked and/or even declined during the following decade similar to what was noted above about Indiana. Of special interest is whether on a per establishment basis revenues have peaked or declined, which would possibly indicate that a saturation point has been reached in casino revenue growth due to more and more establishments operating over time.
In looking at Table 2 , which like the other tables in this paper uses fiscal year (July 1 to June 30) numbers, the first few years of the decade showed on a per establishment basis a good average growth rate of almost 12.8, yet afterwards, growth slowed from the middle of the decade up to the onset of the Great Recession (around a 3-4 percent growth rate), and then during and begun to allow gambling at race tracks during the decade (Iowa has had racinos since the 1990s).
In order to keep revenues from stagnating or falling, states which previously only had riverboat gaming changed their laws to allow land based gaming in order to increase attendance and revenues (e.g., Illinois and Indiana) or permitted gambling at race tracks (e.g., Indiana and Louisiana among others). This paper puts forth that casino revenues are now probably at the maturity stage of the product life cycle and offers models to support this contention.
(Insert Table 4 around here)
The growth function in semi-logarithmic specification for the panel data (across states over time [1991 -2010] 8 ) was estimated using a fixed effects model with state fixed effects 9 and is presented in Table 4 . Results in the first column indicate that establishment and establishment squared are not statistically significant. In the second and third columns, establishment squared is statistically significant (α < 0.10) and has a negative coefficient. Therefore there is a little evidence that revenues may increase, peak, and then decline over time. Per-capita real state domestic product has a positive and significant relationship with tax receipts in the first model (column 1) but is not statistically significant in the others. The recession dummy is not significant in all three specifications, although the unemployment rate variable works in all three models at an alpha value of below 10% and has a negative coefficient. Therefore, cyclical effects matter with casino tax revenues. But the most interesting results in these specifications are the estimated coefficients on the year variables. In the first specification, the year variable is positive and significant, illustrating that the tax revenues for S-L governments are growing every year for all states in the model. To determine whether the tax revenue for states has stagnated or declined, a quadratic and cubic terms are introduced in the next two specifications. In the second specification, the quadratic term (year) is significant and negative, indicating that the growth rate of tax receipts to state and local governments has started to decline in the later years and follows a 'S shaped" trend or pattern like the latter stages of a product life cycle 10 . The third specification in which there are quadratic and cubic year terms does not have these variables showing statistical significance.
(Insert Table 5 around here)
The growth function of tax revenues was estimated by including games -slots and tables in the semi-log specification for 7 states 11 in the state fixed effect model. The results in Table 5 columns 1 to 3 indicate that adding tables and slots did not have that much of an impact on adding more tax revenues. The recession dummy is not statistically significant in any of the models, whereas the state domestic product per capita is only statistically significant in the first model (column 1). In these models the unemployment rate is not statistically significant. The other results in Table 5 column (2) and (3) contain quadratic and cubic specifications for the year variable. The year variables in quadratic specification (column 2) are significant with a positive sign for year and negative sign for the squared term, illustrating a decline in tax revenues for S-L governments. In the cubic specification, only the year variable is significant. In models 1 and 3
(columns 1 and 3), the number of establishments and/or establishments squared were the other variables that were statistically significant implying a direct relationship between number of casinos in a state and tax revenue. In the first model, the increase and then decline in S-L 10 The results were statistically similar when we controlled for number of Native American casinos in this specification. Native American casinos had a negative and significant effect on tax receipts to the state governments. The payout to patrons from Native American casinos is relatively more than other casinos in the state as they pay an average of 10-12 percent of revenue to the state government while commercial casinos pay 19-24 percent of total gaming revenue (National Indian Gaming Commission). The results from this specification are presented in Appendix - Table 1. 11 Colorado, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri and South Dakota revenue is denoted by the statistical significance of the establishment and squared establishment terms.
(Insert Table 6 around here)
A third specification for tax revenues was estimated by including average tax rate paid by the casinos to the S-L governments. This specification was analyzed for a subset of four states 12 .
The results from all three specifications presented in Table 6 indicate that the tax rates have a negative and significant influence on the tax revenue. The third-order polynomial specification in column (3) indicates that higher GDP and lower unemployment rates have a significant and positive effect on the tax revenues, while the higher tax rates reduces tax revenues to the state and local governments. All three year variables (first, second and third order) are significant and exhibit an S-curve configuration. These results indicate that growth of tax revenue for S-L governments started to decline in later years and follows a pattern similar to a product life cycle. had riverboat gaming changed their laws to allow land based gaming in order to increase attendance and revenues (e.g., Illinois and Indiana) or permitted gambling at race tracks (e.g., Indiana and Louisiana among others). These efforts are similar to manufacturers "re-positioning" or "re-packaging" a product so as to keep sales from stagnating or to reach broader markets, such as the introduction of iPhones and smart phones as improvements over cell phones, or the introduction of HDTV to replace traditional television sets.
(Insert table 7 around here)
However, it is possible to look at the situation that Illinois faced after Indiana casinos opened and look at the St. Louis area casino situation. Table 7 (Insert Table 8 around here)
Further exploring whether the opening of new casinos in surrounding states have an impact on tax revenue to S-L governments (or "border effects"), we looked at Illinois again by using regression analysis. Again, Illinois was one of the few states that operated casinos in the early 1990s. After that several Midwest states jumped on the bandwagon in granting licenses to run casinos -Iowa, Missouri (1994) and Indiana (1995) . To analyze this border effect on Illinois, we use the annual tax receipts data from 1991 through 2010 for Illinois, and regression equations are estimated including number of casinos in Iowa (Iowa had casinos in operation in 1989) in the model followed by Missouri and Indiana. The results from these three models are presented in On the other hand, perhaps the product life cycle approach to explaining the peak in or plateauing of casino revenues carries more weight than possible border effects because it may not be how many casinos there are in a region but the popularity of casino gaming that is driving revenues and attendance. When casinos were still fairly new in Illinois in the 1990s, the competition from Missouri and Illinois was not a real hindrance because the customer base was still growing since casinos in these states were still in their "growth stage" of the product life cycle. If all revenues are stagnating or peaking in most of these states, regardless of whether it shares a border with a state that also has casinos, then this paper believes that the stagnation in casino revenues may mostly be due to a saturation point being reached among the casino customer base within and among the states, which would correspond to the maturity stage of a product life cycle.
Conclusion:
In this study, we analyzed the stagnating casino revenues and tax receipts for the eleven states using a panel data from 1991 -2010. Our analyses indicate that tax receipts for state governments followed an S-shaped growth pattern with higher growth rate during the decade of With revenues apparently stagnating, even during a recovery stage in the current business cycle (as of mid -2013), and with more states legalizing or thinking about legalizing gambling, the casino industry in the US faces the challenge of how it can once again "re-invent" or reposition itself to prevent a decline in future revenues or market share. Another option may be for the casinos to ask for assistance from the states in which they operate-the state of Indiana recently gave tax breaks to its casinos in order to help them deal with new competition from casinos in Ohio (Cook 2013) . Our results indicate that the casino industry in the US may be in the maturity stage of the product life cycle. With online gaming currently being debated in the US, one has to wonder whether physical gambling venues offer as much promise in the future as they did in the past. Unless casino firms are able to offer more and better entertainment or other features to draw in consumers, the traditional casino organizational arrangement could be faced with declines in sales into the foreseeable future, which would mean less tax revenues to the states, unless states are able to somehow tap into any revenues from possible legalized sports gambling and/or online gambling, which could also mean opening up investment from foreign 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010   Colorado  40  65  60  58  57  54  49  48  45  43  43  44  45  47  46  43  41  40  39  39 Illinois 5 9 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 Indiana 0 0 0 0 0  0  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  Mississippi  0  0  11  11  11  13  15  15  35  21  36  33  33  31  33  31  34  34  30  30  Missouri  0  0  4  4  6  7  11  11  11  13  16  12  13  15  14  12  15  16  12  12  Nevada  192  186  207  207  213  229  235  235  238  321  325  248  263  259  269  264  209  204  256  270  New Jersey  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  13  13  15  12  13  14  17  14  13  15  11  11  South  Dakota  79  80  83  87  94  98  91  89  92  95  108  112  113  116  123  138  139  137  138  140 Source: Dadayan and Ward and state gaming commission reports. 
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